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Abstract In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on sub-
sets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is
guessable iff it is in the second ambiguous class (∆02), iff it is eventually annihi-
lated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof
of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal
limit on how often one can change one’s mind. We show that for every ordinal
α , a guessable set is annihilated by α applications of the simplified remainder if
and only if it is guessable with fewer than α mind changes. We use guessability
with fewer than α mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff
difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge’s notion of guessability can be
generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of ∆0α for
all successor ordinals α > 1.
1 Introduction
Let NN be the set of sequences s : N → N and let N<N be the set ∪nNn of finite
sequences. If s ∈ N<N, we will write [s] for { f ∈ NN : f extends s}. We equip NN
with a second-countable topology by declaring [s] to be a basic open set whenever
s ∈ N<N.
Throughout the paper, S will denote a subset of NN. We say that S ∈ ∆02 if S is
simultaneously a countable intersection of open sets and a countable union of closed
sets in the above topology. In classic terminology, S ∈ ∆02 just in case S is both Gδ
and Fσ .
The following notion was discovered by Wadge [9] (pp. 141–142) and indepen-
dently by this author [1]. 1
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Definition 1.1 We say S is guessable if there is a function G : N<N →{0,1} such
that for every f ∈ NN,
lim
n→∞
G( f ↾ n) = χS( f ) =
{
1, if f ∈ S,
0, if f 6∈ S.
If so, we say G guesses S, or that G is an S-guesser.
The intution behind the above notion is captured eloquently by Wadge (p. 142,
notation changed):
Guessing sets allow us to form an opinion as to whether an element f of NN is
in S or Sc, given only a finite initial segment f ↾ n of f .
Game theoretically, one envisions an asymmetric game where II (the guesser) has
perfect information, I (the sequence chooser) has zero information, and II’s winning
set consists of all sequences (a0,b0,a1,b1, . . .) such that bi → 1 if (a0,a1, . . .)∈ S and
bi → 0 otherwise.
The following result was proved in [9] (pp.144–145) by infinite game-theoretical
methods. The present author found a second proof [1] using mathematical logical
methods.
Theorem 1.2 (Wadge) S is guessable if and only if S ∈ ∆02.
Wadge defined (pp. 113–114) the following remainder operation.
Definition 1.3 For A,B ⊆ NN, define Rm0(A,B) = NN. For µ > 0 an ordinal,
define
Rmµ(A,B) =
⋂
ν<µ
(
Rmν(A,B)∩A∩Rmν(A,B)∩B
)
.
(Here • denotes topological closure.) Write Rmµ(S) for Rmµ(S,Sc).
By countability considerations, there is some (in fact countable) ordinal µ , de-
pending on S, such that Rmµ(S) = Rmµ ′(S) for all µ ′ ≥ µ ; Wadge writes RmΩ(S)
for Rmµ(S) for such a µ . He then proves the following theorem:
Theorem 1.4 (Wadge, attributed to Hausdorff) S ∈ ∆02 if and only if RmΩ(S) = /0.
In Section 2, we introduce a simpler remainder (S,α) 7→ Sα and use it to give a
new proof of Theorem 1.4.
In Section 3, we introduce the notion of S being guessable while changing one’s
mind fewer than α many times (α ∈Ord) and show that this is equivalent to Sα = /0.
In Section 4, we show that for α > 0, S is guessable while changing one’s mind
fewer than α + 1 many times if and only if at least one of S or Sc is in the αth level
of the difference hierarchy.
In Section 5, we generalize guessability, introducing the notion of µ th-order
guessability (1 ≤ µ < ω1). We show that S is µ th-order guessable if and only if
S ∈ ∆0µ+1.
2 Guessable Sets and Remainders
In this section we give a new proof of Theorem 1.4. We find it easier to work with
the following remainder2 which is closely related to the remainder defined by Wadge.
For X ⊆ N<N, we will write [X ] to denote the set of infinite sequences all of whose
finite initial segments lie in X .
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Definition 2.1 Let S ⊆ NN. We define Sα ⊆ N<N (α ∈ Ord) by transfinite recur-
sion as follows. We define S0 = N<N, and Sλ = ∩β<λ Sβ for every limit ordinal λ .
Finally, for every ordinal β , we define
Sβ+1 = {x ∈ Sβ : ∃x′,x′′ ∈ [Sβ ] such that x⊆ x′, x⊆ x′′, x′ ∈ S, x′′ 6∈ S}.
We write α(S) for the minimal ordinal α such that Sα = Sα+1, and we write S∞ for
Sα(S).
Clearly Sα ⊆ Sβ whenever β < α . This remainder notion is related to Wadge’s as
follows.
Lemma 2.2 For each ordinal α , Rmα(S) = [Sα ].
Proof Since Sα ⊆ Sβ whenever β < α , for all α , we have Sα = ∩β<αSβ+1
(with the convention that ∩ /0 = N<N). We will show by induction on α that
Rmα(S) = [Sα ] = [∩β<αSβ+1].
Suppose f ∈ [∩β<α Sβ+1]. Let β < α . Let U be an open set around f , we
can assume U is basic open, so U = [ f0], f0 a finite initial segment of f . Since
f ∈ [∩β<α Sβ+1], f0 ∈ Sβ+1. Thus there are x′,x′′ ∈ [Sβ ] extending f0 (hence in
U ), x′ ∈ S, x′′ 6∈ S. In other words, x′ ∈ [∩γ<β Sγ+1]∩ S and x′′ ∈ [∩γ<β Sγ+1]∩ Sc.
By induction, x′ ∈ Rmβ (S) ∩ S and x′′ ∈ Rmβ (S) ∩ Sc. By arbitrariness of U ,
f ∈ Rmβ (S)∩S∩Rmβ (S)∩Sc. By arbitrariness of β , f ∈ Rmα(S).
The reverse inclusion is similar.
Note that Lemma 2.2 does not say that Rmα(S) = /0 if and only if Sα = /0. It is (at
least a priori) possible that Sα 6= /0 while [Sα ] = /0. Lemma 2.2 does however imply
that RmΩ(S) = /0 if and only if S∞ = /0, since it is easy to see that if [Sα ] = /0 then
Sα+1 = /0. Thus in order to prove Theorem 1.4 it suffices to show that S is guessable
if and only if S∞ = /0. The ⇒ direction requires no additional machinery.
Proposition 2.3 If S is guessable then S∞ = /0.
Proof Let G : N<N → {0,1} be an S-guesser. Assume (for contradiction)
S∞ 6= /0 and let σ0 ∈ S∞. We will build a sequence on whose initial segments
G diverges, contrary to Definition 1.1. Inductively suppose we have finite se-
quences σ0 ⊂ 6= · · · ⊂ 6= σk in S∞ such that ∀0 < i ≤ k, G(σi) ≡ i mod 2. Since
σk ∈ S∞ = Sα(S) = Sα(S)+1, there are σ ′,σ ′′ ∈ [S∞], extending σk, with σ ′ ∈ S, σ ′′ 6∈ S.
Choose σ ∈ {σ ′,σ ′′} with σ ∈ S iff k is even. Then limn→∞ G(σ ↾ n)≡ k+1 mod 2.
Let σk+1 ⊂ σ properly extend σk such that G(σk+1)≡ k+1 mod 2. Note σk+1 ∈ S∞
since σ ∈ [S∞].
By induction, there are σ0 ⊂ 6= σ1 ⊂ 6= · · · such that for i > 0, G(σi) ≡ i mod 2.
This contradicts Definition 1.1 since limn→∞ G((∪iσi) ↾ n) ought to converge.
The ⇐ direction requires a little machinery.
Definition 2.4 If σ ∈ N<N, σ 6∈ S∞, let β (σ) be the least ordinal such that
σ 6∈ Sβ (σ).
Note that whenever σ 6∈ S∞, β (σ) is a successor ordinal.
Lemma 2.5 Suppose σ ⊆ τ are finite sequences. If τ ∈ S∞ then σ ∈ S∞. And if
σ 6∈ S∞, then β (τ)≤ β (σ).
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Proof It is enough to show that ∀β ∈ Ord, if τ ∈ Sβ then σ ∈ Sβ . This is by
induction on β , the limit and zero cases being trivial. Assume β is successor. If
τ ∈ Sβ , this means τ ∈ Sβ−1 and there are τ ′,τ ′′ ∈ [Sβ−1] extending τ with τ ′ ∈ S,
τ ′′ 6∈ S. Since τ ′ and τ ′′ extend τ , and τ extends σ , τ ′ and τ ′′ extend σ ; and since
σ ∈ Sβ−1 (by induction), this shows σ ∈ Sβ .
Lemma 2.6 Suppose f : N→ N, f 6∈ [S∞]. There is some i such that for all j ≥ i,
f ↾ j 6∈ S∞ and β ( f ↾ j) = β ( f ↾ i). Furthermore, f ∈ [Sβ ( f ↾i)−1].
Proof The first part follows from Lemma 2.5 and the well-foundedness of
Ord. For the second part we must show f ↾ k ∈ Sβ ( f ↾i)−1 for every k. If k ≤ i,
then f ↾ k ∈ Sβ ( f ↾i)−1 by Lemma 2.5. If k ≥ i, then β ( f ↾ k) = β ( f ↾ i) and so
f ↾ k ∈ Sβ ( f ↾i)−1 since it is in Sβ ( f ↾k)−1 by definition of β .
Definition 2.7 If S∞ = /0 then we define GS : N<N → {0,1} as follows. Let
σ ∈ N<N. Since S∞ = /0, σ 6∈ S∞, so σ ∈ Sβ (σ)−1\Sβ (σ). Since σ 6∈ Sβ (σ), this
means for every two extensions x′,x′′ of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1], either x′,x′′ ∈ S or x′,x′′ ∈ Sc.
So either all extensions of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1] are in S, or all such extensions are in Sc.
(i) If there are no extensions of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1], and length(σ) > 0, then let
GS(σ) = GS(σ−) where σ− is obtained from σ by removing the last term.
(ii) If there are no extensions of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1], and length(σ) = 0, let GS(σ) = 0.
(iii) If there are extensions of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1] and they are all in S, define
GS(σ) = 1.
(iv) If there are extensions of σ in [Sβ (σ)−1] and they are all in Sc, define
GS(σ) = 0.
Proposition 2.8 If S∞ = /0 then GS guesses S.
Proof Assume S∞ = /0. Let f ∈ S. I will show GS( f ↾ n)→ 1 as n → ∞. Since
f 6∈ [S∞], let i be as in Lemma 2.6. I claim GS( f ↾ j) = 1 whenever j ≥ i. Fix j ≥ i.
We have β ( f ↾ j) = β ( f ↾ i) by choice of i, and f ∈ [Sβ ( f ↾i)−1] = [Sβ ( f ↾ j)−1]. Since
f ↾ j has one extension (namely f itself) in both [Sβ ( f ↾ j)−1] and S, GS( f ↾ j) = 1.
Identical reasoning shows that if f 6∈ S then limn→∞ GS( f ↾ n) = 0.
Theorem 2.9 S ∈ ∆02 if and only if S∞ = /0. That is, Theorem 1.4 is true.
Proof By combining Propositions 2.3 and 2.8 and Theorem 1.2.
3 Guessing without changing one’s Mind too often
In this section our goal is to tease out additional information about ∆02 from the
operation defined in Definition 2.1.
Definition 3.1 For each function G with domainN<N, if G( f ↾ (n+1)) 6=G( f ↾ n)
( f ∈ NN, n ∈ N), we say G changes its mind on f ↾ (n+ 1). Now let α ∈ Ord. We
say S is guessable with < α mind changes if there is an S-guesser G along with a
function H : N<N → α such that the following hold, where f ∈ NN and n ∈ N.
(i) H( f ↾ (n+ 1))≤ H( f ↾ n).
(ii) If G changes its mind on f ↾ (n+ 1), then H( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H( f ↾ n).
This notion bears some resemblance to the notion of a set Z ⊆ N being f -c.e. in
[4], or g-c.a. in [7].
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Theorem 3.2 For α ∈ Ord, S is guessable with < α mind changes if and only if
Sα = /0.
Proof
(⇒) Assume S is guessable with < α mind changes. Let G,H be as in Definition
3.1. We claim that for all β ∈ Ord, if σ ∈ Sβ then H(σ) ≥ β . This will prove (⇒)
because it implies that if Sα 6= /0 then there is some σ with H(σ)≥ α , absurd since
codomain(H) = α .
We attack the claim by induction on β . The zero and limit cases are trivial. As-
sume β = γ+1. Suppose σ ∈ Sγ+1. There are x′,x′′ ∈ [Sγ ] extending σ , x′ ∈ S, x′′ 6∈ S.
Pick x∈{x′,x′′} so that χS(x) 6=G(σ) and pick σ+ ∈N<N with σ ⊆σ+⊆ x such that
G(σ+) = χS(x) (some such σ+ exists since G guesses S). Since x ∈ [Sγ ], σ+ ∈ Sγ .
By induction, H(σ+)≥ γ . The fact G(σ+) 6= G(σ) implies H(σ+)<H(σ), forcing
H(σ)≥ γ + 1.
(⇐) Assume Sα = /0. For all σ ∈ N<N, define H(σ) = β (σ)− 1 (by definition of
β (σ), since Sα = /0, clearly H(σ) ∈ α). I claim GS,H witness that S is guessable
with < α mind changes.
By Proposition 2.8, GS guesses S. Let f ∈ NN, n ∈ N. By Lemma 2.5,
H( f ↾ (n + 1)) ≤ H( f ↾ n). Now suppose GS changes its mind on f ↾ (n + 1),
we must show H( f ↾ (n+ 1)) < H( f ↾ n). Assume, for sake of contradiction, that
H( f ↾ (n+ 1)) = H( f ↾ n). Assume GS( f ↾ n) = 0, the other case is similar. By
definition of GS, (∗) for every infinite extension f ′ of f ↾ n, if f ′ ∈ [Sβ ( f ↾n)−1] then
f ′ ∈ Sc. Since GS changes its mind on f ↾ (n+ 1), GS( f ↾ (n+ 1)) = 1. Thus (∗∗)
for every infinite extension f ′′ of f ↾ (n+ 1), if f ′′ ∈ [Sβ ( f ↾(n+1))−1] then f ′′ ∈ S.
And f ↾ (n+1) does actually have some such infinite extension f ′′, because if it had
none, that would make GS( f ↾ (n+1)) = GS( f ↾ n) by case 1 of the definition of GS
(Definition 2.7). Being an extension of f ↾ (n+ 1), f ′′ also extends f ↾ n; and by the
assumption that H( f ↾ (n+1)) = H( f ↾ n), f ′′ ∈ [Sβ ( f ↾n)−1]. By (∗), f ′′ ∈ Sc, and by
(∗∗), f ′′ ∈ S. Absurd.
It is not hard to show S is a Boolean combination of open sets if and only if S is
guessable with <ω mind changes, so Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 2.2 give a new proof
of a special case of the main theorem (p. 1348) of [3] (see also [2]).
4 Mind Changing and the Difference Hierarchy
We recall the following definition from [5] (p. 175, stated in greater generality—we
specialize it to the Baire space). In this definition, Σ01(NN) is the set of open subsets
of NN, and the parity of an ordinal η is the equivalence class modulo 2 of n, where
η = λ + n, λ a limit ordinal (or λ = 0), n ∈ N.
Definition 4.1 Let (Aη)η<θ be an increasing sequence of subsets of NN with
θ ≥ 1. Define the set Dθ ((Aη)η<θ )⊆ NN by
x ∈ Dθ ((Aη )η<θ ) ⇔ x ∈
⋃
η<θ
Aη & the least η < θ with x ∈ Aη has parity
opposite to that of θ .
Let
Dθ (Σ01)(NN) = {Dθ ((Aη)η<θ ) : Aη ∈ Σ01(NN), η < θ}.
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This hierarchy offers a constructive characterization of ∆02: it turns out that
∆02 = ∪1≤θ<ω1Dθ (Σ
0
1)(N
N)
(see Theorem 22.27 of [5], p. 176, attributed to Hausdorff and Kuratowski).
For brevity, we will write Dα for Dα(Σ01)(NN).
Theorem 4.2 (Semi-characterization of the difference hierarchy) Let α > 0. The
following are equivalent.
(i) S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes.
(ii) S ∈ Dα or Sc ∈ Dα .
We will prove Theorem 4.2 by a sequence of smaller results.
Definition 4.3 For α,β ∈Ord, write α ≡ β to indicate that α and β have the same
parity (that is, 2|n−m, where α = λ + n and β = κ +m, n,m ∈ N, λ a limit ordinal
or 0, κ a limit ordinal or 0).
Proposition 4.4 Let α > 0. If S ∈ Dα , say S = Dα((Aη)η<α ) (Aη ⊆ NN open),
then S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes.
Proof Define G : N<N → {0,1} and H : N<N → α + 1 as follows. Suppose
σ ∈ N<N. If there is no η < α such that [σ ] ⊆ Aη , let G(σ) = 0 and let H(σ) = α .
If there is an η < α (we may take η minimal) such that [σ ]⊆ Aη , then let
G(σ) =
{
0, if η ≡ α;
1, if η 6≡ α , H(σ) = η .
Let f : N→N.
Claim 1 limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = χS( f ).
If f 6∈ ∪η<α Aη , then f 6∈ Dα((Aη)η<α ) = S, and G( f ↾ n) will always be 0, so
limn→∞ G( f ↾ n)= 0= χS( f ). Assume f ∈∪η<α Aη , and let η <α be minimum such
that f ∈ Aη . Since Aη is open, there is some n0 so large that ∀n ≥ n0, [ f ↾ n]⊆ Aη .
For all n ≥ n0, by minimality of η , [ f ↾ n] 6⊆ Aη ′ for any η ′ < η , so G( f ↾ n) = 0 if
and only if η ≡ α . The following are equivalent.
f ∈ S iff f ∈ Dα((Aη)η<α )
iff η 6≡ α
iff G( f ↾ n) 6= 0
iff G( f ↾ n) = 1.
This shows limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = χS( f ).
Claim 2 ∀n ∈ N, H( f ↾ (n+ 1))≤ H( f ↾ n).
If H( f ↾ n) = α , there is nothing to prove. If H( f ↾ n) < α , then H( f ↾ n) = η
where η is minimal such that [ f ↾ n] ⊆ Aη . Since [ f ↾ (n+ 1)] ⊆ [ f ↾ n], we have
[ f ↾ (n+ 1)]⊆ Aη , implying H( f ↾ (n+ 1))≤ η .
Claim 3 ∀n ∈ N, if G( f ↾ (n+ 1)) 6= G( f ↾ n), then H( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H( f ↾ n).
Assume (for sake of contradiction) H( f ↾ (n + 1)) ≥ H( f ↾ n). By Claim
2, H( f ↾ (n + 1)) = H( f ↾ n). By definition of H this implies that ∀η < α ,
[ f ↾ (n+1)]⊆ Aη if and only if [ f ↾ n]⊆ Aη . This implies G( f ↾ (n+1)) = G( f ↾ n),
contradiction.
By Claims 1–3, G and H witness that S is guessable with < α +1 mind changes.
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Corollary 4.5 Let α > 0. If S ∈ Dα or Sc ∈ Dα then S is guessable with < α + 1
mind changes.
Proof If S ∈Dα this is immediate by Proposition 4.4. If Sc ∈Dα then Proposition
4.4 says Sc is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes, and this clearly implies that S
is too.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose S is guessable with<α mind changes. Let G :N<N→{0,1},
H : N<N → α be a pair of functions witnessing as much (Definition 3.1). There is
an H ′ : N<N → α such that G,H ′ also witness that S is guessable with < α
mind changes, with H ′( /0) = H( /0), and with the additional property that for every
f : N→ N and every n ∈ N,
H( f ↾ (n+1)) ≡ H( f ↾ n) if and only if G( f ↾ (n+1)) = G( f ↾ n).
Proof Define H ′(σ) by induction on the length of σ as follows. Let H ′( /0) =H( /0).
If σ 6= /0, write σ = σ0 ⌢ n for some n ∈ N (⌢ denotes concatenation). If
G(σ) = G(σ0), let H ′(σ) = H ′(σ0). Otherwise, let H ′(σ) be either H(σ) or
H(σ)+ 1, whichever has parity opposite to H ′(σ0).
By construction H ′ has the desired parity properties. A simple inductive argu-
ment shows that (∗) ∀σ ∈ N<N, H(σ) ≤ H ′(σ) < α . I claim that for all f : N→ N
and n ∈ N, H ′( f ↾ (n + 1)) ≤ H ′( f ↾ n), and if G( f ↾ (n + 1)) 6= G( f ↾ n) then
H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H ′( f ↾ n).
If G( f ↾ (n+1))=G( f ↾ n), then by definition H ′( f ↾ (n+1))=H ′( f ↾ n) and the
claim is trivial. Now assume G( f ↾ (n+1)) 6=G( f ↾ n). If H ′( f ↾ (n+1))=H( f ↾ (n+1))
then H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H( f ↾ n)≤ H ′( f ↾ n) and we are done. Assume
H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1)) 6= H( f ↾ (n+ 1)),
which forces that (∗∗) H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1)) = H( f ↾ (n+ 1))+ 1. To see that
H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H ′( f ↾ n),
assume not (∗ ∗ ∗). By Definition 3.1, H( f ↾ (n+ 1))< H( f ↾ n), so
H( f ↾ n)≥ H( f ↾ (n+ 1))+ 1 (Basic arithmetic)
= H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1)) (By (∗∗))
≥ H ′( f ↾ n) (By (∗ ∗ ∗))
≥ H( f ↾ n). (By (∗))
Equality holds throughout, and H ′( f ↾ (n+1))= H ′( f ↾ n). Contradiction: we chose
H ′( f ↾ (n+ 1)) with parity opposite to H ′( f ↾ n).
Definition 4.7 For all G,H as in Definition 3.1, f ∈ NN, write G( f ) for
limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) (so G( f ) = χS( f )) and write H( f ) for limn→∞ H( f ↾ n). Write
G ≡ H to indicate that ∀ f ∈ NN, G( f ) ≡ H( f ); write G 6≡ H to indicate that
∀ f ∈ NN, G( f ) 6≡ H( f ) (we pronounce G 6≡ H as “G is anticongruent to H”).
Lemma 4.8 Suppose G : N<N→{0,1} and H : N<N→ α witness that S is guess-
able with < α mind changes. There is an H ′ : N<N→ α such that G,H ′ witness that
S is guessable with < α mind changes, and such that the following hold.
If G( /0)≡ α then H ′ 6≡ G. If G( /0) 6≡ α then H ′ ≡ G.
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Proof I claim that without loss of generality, we may assume the following (∗):
If G( /0)≡ α then H( /0) 6≡ G( /0). If G( /0) 6≡ α then H( /0)≡ G( /0).
To see this, suppose not: either G( /0) ≡ α and H( /0) ≡ G( /0), or else G( /0) 6≡ α and
H( /0) 6≡G( /0). In either case, H( /0)≡α . If H( /0)≡α then H( /0)+1 6=α , and so, since
H( /0)< α , H( /0)+1< α , meaning we may add 1 to H( /0) to enforce the assumption.
Having assumed (∗), we may use Lemma 4.6 to construct H ′ : N<N → α such
that G,H ′ witness that S is guessable with < α mind changes, H ′( /0) = H( /0), and H ′
changes parity precisely when G changes parity. The latter facts, combined with (∗),
prove the lemma.
Proposition 4.9 Suppose G : N<N → {0,1} and H : N<N → α + 1 witness that S
is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes. If G( /0) = 0 then S ∈ Dα .
Proof By Lemma 4.8 we may safely assume the following:
If G( /0)≡ α + 1 then H 6≡ G. If G( /0) 6≡ α + 1 then H ≡ G.
In other words,
(∗) If G( /0)≡ α then H ≡ G. (∗∗) If G( /0) 6≡ α then H 6≡ G.
For each η < α , let
Aη = { f ∈ NN : H( f )≤ η}. (H( f ) as in Definition 4.7)
I claim S = Dα((Aη )η<α), which will prove the proposition since each Aη is clearly
open.
Suppose f ∈ S, I will show f ∈ Dα((Aη )η<α). Since f ∈ S, H( f ) 6= α , because
if H( f ) were = α , this would imply that G never changes its mind on f , forcing
limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = limn→∞ G( /0) = 0, contradicting the fact that G guesses S.
Since H( f ) 6= α , H( f ) < α . It follows that for η = H( f ) we have f ∈ Aη and η
is minimal with this property.
Case 1: G( /0) ≡ α . By (∗), H ≡ G. Since f ∈ S, limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = 1, so
η = limn→∞ H( f ↾ n) ≡ 1. Since α ≡ G( /0) = 0, this shows η 6≡ α , putting
f ∈ Dα((Aη )η<α).
Case 2: G( /0) 6≡ α . By (∗∗), H 6≡ G. Since f ∈ S, limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = 1,
so η = limn→∞ H( f ↾ n) ≡ 0. Since α 6≡ G( /0) = 0, this shows η 6≡ α , so
f ∈ Dα((Aη )η<α).
Conversely, suppose f ∈ Dα((Aη)η<α), I will show f ∈ S. Let η be minimal such
that f ∈ Aη (by definition of Aη , η = H( f )). By definition of Dα((Aη )η<α), η 6≡ α .
Case 1: G( /0)≡α . By (∗), H ≡G. Since limn→∞ H( f ↾ n)=H( f )=η 6≡α ≡G( /0)= 0,
we see limn→∞ H( f ↾ n) = 1. Since H ≡G, limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = 1, forcing f ∈ S since
G guesses S.
Case 2: G( /0) 6≡ α . By (∗∗), H 6≡ G. Since
lim
n→∞
H( f ↾ n) = H( f ) = η 6≡ α 6≡ G( /0) = 0,
we see limn→∞ H( f ↾ n) = 0. Since H 6≡ G, limn→∞ G( f ↾ n) = 1, again showing
f ∈ S.
Corollary 4.10 If S is guessable with < α + 1 mind changes, then S ∈ Dα or
Sc ∈ Dα .
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Proof Let G,H witness that S is guessable with<α+1 mind changes. If G( /0) = 0
then S ∈ Dα by Proposition 4.9. If not, then (1−G),H witness that Sc is guessable
with < α +1 mind changes, and (1−G)( /0) = 0, so Sc ∈Dα by Proposition 4.9.
Combining Corollaries 4.5 and 4.10 proves Theorem 4.2.
5 Higher-order Guessability
In this section we introduce a notion that generalizes guessability to provide a char-
acterization for ∆0µ+1 (1 ≤ µ < ω1). We will show that S ∈ ∆0µ+1 if and only if S is
µ th-order guessable. Throughout this section, µ denotes an ordinal in [1,ω1).
Definition 5.1 Let S = (S0,S1, . . .) be a countably infinite tuple of subsets
Si ⊆ NN.
(i) For every f ∈NN, write S ( f ) for the sequence (χS0( f ),χS1( f ), . . .)∈{0,1}N.
(ii) We say that S is guessable based on S if there is a function
G : {0,1}<N→{0,1}
(called an S-guesser based on S ) such that ∀ f ∈ NN,
lim
n→∞
G(S ( f ) ↾ n) = χS( f ).
Game theoretically, we envision a game where I (the sequence chooser) has zero
information and II (the guesser) has possibly better-than-perfect information: II is
allowed to ask (once per turn) whether I’s sequence lies in various Si. For each Si,
player I’s act (by answering the question) of committing to play a sequence in Si or
in Sci is similar to the act (described in [6], p. 366) of choosing a I-imposed subgame.
Example 5.2 If S enumerates the sets of the form { f ∈ NN : f (i) = j}, i, j ∈ N
then it is not hard to show that S is guessable (in the sense of Definition 1.1) if and
only if S is guessable based on S .
Definition 5.3 We say S is µ th-order guessable if there is some S = (S0,S1, . . .)
as in Definition 5.1 such that the following hold.
(i) S is guessable based on S .
(ii) ∀i, Si ∈ ∆0µi+1 for some µi < µ .
Theorem 5.4 S is µ th-order guessable if and only if S ∈ ∆0µ+1.
In order to prove Theorem 5.4 we will assume the following result, which is a
specialization and rephrasing of Exercise 22.17 of [5] (pp. 172–173, attributed to
Kuratowski).
Lemma 5.5 The following are equivalent.
(i) S ∈ ∆0µ+1.
(ii) There is a sequence (Ai)i∈N, each Ai ∈ ∆0µi+1 for some µi < µ , such that
S =
⋃
n
⋂
m≥n
Am =
⋂
n
⋃
m≥n
Am.
Proof of Theorem 5.4
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(⇒) Let S = (S0,S1, . . .) and G witness that S is µ th-order guessable (so each
Si ∈ ∆0µi+1 for some µi < µ). For all a ∈ {0,1} and X ⊆ NN, define
Xa =
{
X , if a = 1;
N
N\X , if a = 0.
For notational convenience, we will write “G(~a) = 1” as an abbreviation for
“0 ≤ a0, . . . ,am−1 ≤ 1 and G(a0, . . . ,am−1) = 1,” provided m is clear from con-
text. Observe that for all f ∈ NN and m ∈ N, G(S ( f ) ↾ m) = 1 if and only if
f ∈ ⋃
G(~a)=1
m−1⋂
j=0
Sa jj .
Now, given f : N→ N, f ∈ S if and only if G(S ( f ) ↾ n)→ 1, which is true if and
only if ∃n∀m≥ n, G(S ( f ) ↾ m) = 1. Thus
f ∈ S iff ∃n∀m≥ n, G(S ( f ) ↾ m) = 1
iff ∃n∀m≥ n, f ∈ ⋃
G(~a)=1
m−1⋂
j=0
Sa jj
iff f ∈⋃
n
⋂
m≥n
⋃
G(~a)=1
m−1⋂
j=0
Sa jj .
So
S =
⋃
n
⋂
m≥n
⋃
G(~a)=1
m−1⋂
j=0
Sa jj .
At the same time, since G(S ( f ) ↾ m)→ 0 whenever f 6∈ S, we see f ∈ S if and only
if ∀n∃m≥ n such that G(S ( f ) ↾ m) = 1. Thus by similar reasoning to the above,
S =
⋂
n
⋃
m≥n
⋃
G(~a)=1
m−1⋂
j=0
Sa jj .
For each m,
⋃
G(~a)=1
⋂m−1
j=0 S
a j
j is a finite union of finite intersections of sets in ∆
0
µ ′+1
for various µ ′< µ , thus⋃G(~a)=1⋂m−1j=0 Sa jj itself is in ∆0µm+1 for some µm < µ . Letting
Am =
⋃
G(~a)=1
⋂m−1
j=0 S
a j
j , Lemma 5.5 says S ∈ ∆
0
µ+1.
(⇐) Assume S ∈ ∆0µ+1. By Lemma 5.5, there are (Ai)i∈N, each Ai ∈ ∆0µi+1 for some
µi < µ , such that
S =
⋃
n
⋂
m≥n
Am =
⋂
n
⋃
m≥n
Am. (∗)
I claim that S is guessable based on S = (A0,A1, . . .). Define G : {0,1}<N→ {0,1}
by G(a0, . . . ,am) = am, I will show that G is an S-guesser based on S .
Suppose f ∈ S. By (∗), ∃n s.t. ∀m≥ n, f ∈ Am and thus χAm( f ) = 1. For all m≥ n,
G(S ( f ) ↾ (m+ 1)) = G(χA0( f ), . . . ,χAm( f ))
= χAm( f )
= 1,
so limn→∞ G(S ( f ) ↾ n) = 1. A similar argument shows that if f 6∈ S then
limn→∞ G(S ( f ) ↾ n) = 0.
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Combining Theorems 1.2 and 5.4, we see that S is guessable if and only if S is 1st-
order guessable. It is also not difficult to give a direct proof of this equivalence, and
having done so, Theorem 5.4 provides yet another proof of Theorem 1.2.
Notes
1. A third independent usage of the term guessable, with similar but not the same meaning,
appears in [8] (p. 1280), where a subset Y ⊆ NN is called guessable if there is a function
g ∈ NN such that for each f ∈ Y , g(n) = f (n) for infinitely many n.
2. In general, there seems to be a correspondence between remainders on NN and remainders
on N<N that take trees to trees; in the future we might publish more general work based
on this observation.
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